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FIFTH ANNUAL LLOYD K. GARRISON
LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Thirty Years of Environmental Protection
Law in the Supreme Court
RiCHARD J. LAzARus*
It is an honor to present a lecture named after Lloyd Garrison
and to be here at Pace Law School. It is especially fitting, of
course, that the first Garrison Lecture was presented by Pace's
own David Sive. Professor Sive, as we all know, worked closely
with Garrison on the celebrated Scenic Hudson litigation.1 Few
legal counsel have been so closely identified with the emergence of
the environmental law profession during the past three decades.
* John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
This article and the underlying factual information was first presented at Pace Law
School on March 11, 1999, as the Fifth Annual Lloyd K. Garrison Lecture on Environmental Law, but has been updated in light of a few events occurring subsequent to
that presentation. Because this lecture does not lend itself to a full presentation of
the statistical compilation of United States Supreme Court rulings underlying the
lecture or to a complete elaboration of the related analysis, that fuller version is being
separately published. See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental"
About EnvironmentalLaw in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703 (2000). Special thanks are owed to Staci Krupp, J.D. Candidate 2000, Georgetown University
Law Center, and Alex Steffan, J.D. 1999, Georgetown University Law Center, who
provided excellent research assistance in the preparation of the initial lecture and
this article. This article discusses Supreme Court decisions in many cases, including
some in which I served as counsel for parties involved in the litigation. The views
expressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of those
parties I represented.
1. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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Indeed, if there were such a thing as a legal thesaurus that linked
substantive areas of law with lawyers and one looked up "environmental law," its first synonym would undoubtedly be "David
2
Sive."
I do not and could not, however, make claim to the extraordinary pedigree of David Sive: one of the first of the very first generation of modern environmental lawyers in this country. Nor can a
fair comparison be made to the other three Garrison Lecturers
who preceded me: Professors Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers, and Oliver
Houck. These are true pioneers. They inspired much in the formation of modem environmental protection law, and have served
since in their scholarship and their legal counsel as the law's
guardians and promoters.
But what I strive to claim is a close lineage, as the first of the
second generation of environmental lawyers and scholars to deliver this lecture. I use the term "lineage" deliberately. For
although I did not then know any of them by name, it was the
work of Lloyd Garrison, David Sive, and the others that resulted
in my own decision to engage in the study and practice of environmental law.
I made my decision to become an environmental lawyer during my freshman year in college in 1971, because of the events
then occurring in our nation. Like many of my contemporaries in
environmental law, I saw as my role models those environmental
law activists who seemed to be shaping the nation's future in necessary and positive ways. So it should be no surprise that I feel a
great debt to those who preceded me as Garrison lecturers, and to
Lloyd Garrison, whom I never had the pleasure to meet.
As much as I deliberately, if not obsessively, struck a path of
becoming an environmental lawyer and law professor twentyeight years ago, the actual direction of that path has necessarily
been the result of much happenstance and fortuity. One bit of
good fortune has been my consistent involvement with the U.S.
3
Supreme Court, both as a practicing lawyer and a legal academic.
2. Professor Sive is often referred to as the "father of environmental law." See
Margaret Cronin Fisk, Profiles in Power 100 - The Most Influential Lawyers in
America, NAT'L L.J., March 25, 1991, at S2.
3. I joined the Department of Justice in the fall of 1979, after law school graduation. The Court soon after granted review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), for which I was assigned responsibility for drafting the position of the United
States as amicus curiae. Since then, I have had the opportunity to represent the federal government, state and local governments, and environmental groups in a host of
cases before the Supreme Court.
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This lecture stems from that work by examining the Supreme
Court's role in environmental law's evolution during the past
thirty years, as reflected in the Court's decisions and the votes of
the individual Justices. My view is that those decisions and votes
increasingly suggest a lack of appreciation of environmental law
as a distinct area of law.
This lecture's objectives are three-fold. The first is perhaps
somewhat pedantic, but both revealing and even entertaining for
those (like me) who are preoccupied with the Court. It is to highlight some facts and figures about the past thirty years of environmental and natural resources law cases before the Court that tell
much about the Court and the individual Justices.
The second objective is to suggest what the Court's decisions
tell us about the nature and practice of environmental law. This
includes how environmental law relates to other areas of law with
which it inevitably and repeatedly intersects. It also includes lessons regarding how, accordingly, law students who seek to become
environmental lawyers should approach the study of law. It likewise extends to how environmental lawyers seeking to promote
environmental protection and resource conservation can be the
most effective in litigation.
The third and final objective is more modest. It is to describe
a potentially significant case that the Court heard during the October 1999 Term. The case was important because at stake was
the future role of citizen suit enforcement in environmental law,
which has long been one of environmental law's essential
hallmarks. 4 More broadly, however, the case proved significant
because it provided the Court with a much needed opportunity to
reverse the disturbing trend discernible in its precedent and to
restore what is "environmental" about environmental law.
I.

A Scorecard Of The Justices' Votes In Environmental
Cases

Commencing with the Supreme Court's October Term 1969,
the Court has decided over 240 environmental and natural resources law cases on the merits. 5 There are a host of intriguing
4. See

CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER

EPA ADMINISTERED STATUTES (Environmental Law Institute 1984).
5. A listing of the cases is included in an appendix to this article. Whether a case
is considered "environmental" for the broader purposes of this threshold inquiry turns
on whether environmental protection or natural resources matters are at stake. The
legal issue before the Court need not independently have an environmental character
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factual inquiries that could be undertaken concerning these rulings. This lecture, however, focuses on only three: (1) which Justices wrote the most decisions for the Court during the past thirty
years; (2) which Justices have been in the majority the most frequently; and (3) which Justices have tended to vote for outcomes
that are more rather than less protective of the environment, and
which Justices have tended to do the converse (that is, less rather
than more).
A.

Justice White: The Justice Who Wrote the Most
Environmental Decisions For the Court

In tallying which Justice has written the most environmental
opinions for the Court during the past thirty years, one might
fairly anticipate that the opinions would be split roughly evenly
with Chief Justice Rehnquist leading the pack. After all, the
Chief Justice has served longer on the Court than anyone presently there and his tenure virtually spans the relevant time period, with his joining the Court as a Justice in 1971. But it is in
fact neither the Chief Justice leading the pack nor is it even a
close question as to who has written the most environmental opinions for the Court. Nineteen Justices have served on the Court
during the relevant time period 6 and Justice White, who left the
Court in 1993, is the leading opinion writer for the Court by a
large margin.
Justice White wrote thirty-six opinions. The next closest is
Justice O'Connor with twenty-two opinions for the Court. How is
that revealing? What philosophy does one think about Justice
White and environmental protection? The fairest answer is none
at all.
Justice White harbored no particular interest in environmental law. His opinions are dispassionate, dry, formalistic, with little effort to elaborate any particular philosophical vision. In this
respect, moreover, his environmental law opinions do not differ
from his opinions for the Court generally, which a recent biograto it. The stakes themselves are sufficient to invoke the label. The Garrison lecture
upon which this article is based was delivered on March 11, 1999. Since then, the
Supreme Court has decided two additional environmental cases, City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999), and Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute
Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719 (1999), which have been added to the database and, when relevant, to the discussion in the text of this article.
6. These Justices are: Harlan, Black, Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and there have been two Chief Justices, Burger and Rehnquist.
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phy describes as evidencing little "elaboration of philosophical vi8
sion"7 and "never aspiring beyond plain, workmanlike prose."
Justice White's controlling philosophy (or lack thereof) is exemplified by his votes in three cases during the 1986 October
Term. The Supreme Court during that term handed down the socalled "Takings Trilogy," three cases raising Fifth Amendment
regulatory takings challenges to environmental restrictions: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,9 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 10
and Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission.11 The juxtaposition
of these three cases presented a true jurisprudential paradox and
certainly no readily discernible, coherent view of the Takings
Clause.12
Nor do White's opinions for the Court otherwise suggest any
distinct vision of the role of law in environmental protection. The
Official Papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall provide another
clear example. In Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,13 Justice White wrote for the Court's
slim five-Justice majority an opinion that upheld the United
States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) construction of
the Clean Water Act. As disclosed by the Marshall Papers, however, he did so only after concluding that there is "little or no difference in principle" between the opposing arguments and that
"administrative law will not be measurably advanced or set back
however this case is decided." 14 White did not see the case, whichever way it was decided, as being of significant import. The case
presented only a narrow, fact-bound issue regarding the sufficiency of an administrative record.

7.

DENNIS HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WIZZER WHITE

451 (1998)

(quoting Kate Stith, Byron White: Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19, n.1

(1993)).
8. Id. at 454.
9. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
10. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625 (1988).
13. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
14. Letter from Justice Byron R. White to The Chief Justice, Re: 83-1013 Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC (November 13, 1984) (Official Papers of the
Chambers of Justice Thurgood Marshall).

5
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Justice Kennedy: The Justice Most Often in the Majority in
Environmental Cases

Another revealing factual inquiry concerns the frequency
with which individual Justices were in the majority in environmental cases during the past thirty years. Not surprisingly, Justice White's percentage for being in the majority is very high; he
voted with the majority 89.2 percent of the time. His being in the
majority so often may also provide a neutral explanation for why
White authored so many opinions for the Court. But opportunities and opinions do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. Chief Justice Warren Burger, for instance, had an even higher percentage
for being in the majority and wrote far fewer opinions. The Chief
Justice was in the majority in over 91.5 percent of the 140 environmental cases in which he participated. Yet he wrote only eight
opinions for the Court.
The most telling fact about the tendency of Justices to vote in
the majority, however, does not relate to either Chief Justice Burger or to Justice White. The Justice with the most astounding record for being in the majority is Justice Kennedy. Kennedy has
participated in fifty-seven cases to date. Other than an original
action of interstate water dispute, 15 he has dissented only once, in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.16 The Court, moreover, has since
overruled its eleventh amendment decision in Union Gas.1 7 So, in
effect, Justice Kennedy's record is virtually 100 percent (putting
8
aside a couple of somewhat qualified concurring opinions).'
But how many opinions for the Court has Justice Kennedy
written? One might expect as many as ten but certainly no fewer
than six. But, in fact, until the Court's most recent term, Kennedy
had written only two opinions for the Court.19 He added two more
this past Term. 20 Kennedy supplied, moreover, the deciding fifth
vote in three out of those four cases.
15. See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221 (1991).
16. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
17. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
18. During the October 1991 Term, Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which also joined Justice Scalia's
majority opinion with some qualifications, and a concurring opinion in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), which joined only in the
judgment.
19. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
20. The third and fourth cases were both decided after the formal presentation of
the Garrison lecture this past March. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119
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This is a striking result. The most significant vote has little
direct expression in the Court's opinion writing. Justice Kennedy
is the key to the majority in environmental protection and natural
resources law cases today. Yet he almost never writes an opinion
for the Court on these issues.
The upshot is the exacerbation of the Court's longstanding
lack of environmental voice. Justice White, who wrote most of the
opinions, did not provide it. Justice Kennedy, who now appears to
reflect the controlling philosophy for the Court in these cases, has
similarly not yet expressed an overarching view of the environmental law field. He has instead, like White during the 1970s and
1980s, simply joined opinions that, because they are the products
of shifting majority coalitions, lack any consistent or coherent
theme.
C.

Justice Douglas vs. Justice Scalia: Scoring the Justices on
Environmental Protection

The last categorical inquiry concerns the voting patterns of
individual Justices based on the relationship of their votes to environmental protection objectives. When do their votes promote environmental protection? And when do their votes appear to
undercut it?
Most Court observers' intuitions regarding the Justices would
likely be that those Justices who are considered "liberal" cast
votes in favor of environmental protection concerns, while those
more "conservative" members of the Court do not. To test that
hypothesis, I undertook two detailed analyses of the votes of the
Justices: one more qualitative and the other striving to be quantitative. Interestingly, the more qualitative analysis questions the
intuitive view, while the more quantitative approach restores
some of its force. Each is discussed next.
1. What is most immediately suggested by an admittedly unscientific, impressionistic review of the votes of individual Justices
in environmental cases is the wholly paradoxical nature of the voting patterns if assessed exclusively from an environmental protection perspective. 2 1 The votes of a few Justices in selected cases
are illustrative.
S. Ct. 1624 (1999); Amoco Production Co. v. Southern Ute Tribe, 119 S. Ct. 1719
(1999).
21. My conclusions in this single respect are strikingly similar to those drawn by
Professor Sive, based on his review in 1994 of the Supreme Court's environmental law
rulings in the October 1993 Term. Remarking upon the odd voting patterns of indi-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, has a reputation in the
environmental community for being unsympathetic to environmental protection concerns. There are his votes against more expansive federal reserved water rights in national forests in United
States v. New Mexico;22 against enhanced procedural rights for environmentalists in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.;2 3 against endangered species
protection in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill;2 4 and in favor of a
more aggressive regulatory takings test in both Penn Central v.
City of New York 25 and Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
26
DeBenedictis.
Labeling the Chief Justice as somehow "anti-environmental"
is problematic because many of his votes support environmentalist causes. He voted to uphold environmental criminal convictions
in United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp.;27
supported the validity of stricter local noise controls in City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal;28 concluded that federal installations must comply with state air pollution control requirements in Hancock v. Train2 9 and joined the dissenters in Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society30 in contending that
the U.S. Secretary of Commerce was required to certify Japan for
failing to comply with International Whaling Convention whaling
quotas. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions in a
series of Dormant Commerce Clause cases stress the importance
of the environmental protection goals as an affirmative reason for
31
upholding the challenged governmental action.
Similar crisscrossing tendencies are evident in the votes of
Justice Stevens, who is generally considered sympathetic to envividual Justices in those cases, Professor Sive characterized environmental cases as
making for "strange judicial bedfellows" that Term. See David Sive & Daniel Riesel,
An Analysis of the Justices' Positionsin Environmental Cases Demonstrates that Doctrinal ClassificationsAren't Very Useful, NAT'L L.J., October 3, 1994, at B5.
22. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
23. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
24. 437 U.S. 153, 211 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
26. 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
27. 411 U.S. 655, 676 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. 426 U.S. 167, 199 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. 478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 349 (1992) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting), Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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ronmental protection concerns. Stevens' opinions, widely hailed
by the environmental community, include his opinion for the
Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 3 2 and his dissents in
Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastal Commission,33 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 4 Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo,3 5 and Sec36
retary of the Interior v. California.
But environmentalists do not similarly acclaim Stevens' dissents in California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock, 37 favoring
preemption of state environmental regulation of mining activities
on federal land; in Penn Central, against the constitutionality of a
state historic landmark designation challenged as a regulatory
39
taking; 38 and in EnvironmentalDefense Fund v. City of Chicago,
rejecting the Environmental Defense Fund's claim that an exemption from a federal hazardous waste statute should be narrowly
read. Several of Stevens' votes against positions favored by environmentalists supplied the critical fifth vote for the majority's adverse ruling, including United States v. New Mexico, 40 Industrial
42
Union v. American Petroleum,4 1 and Japan Whaling Ass'n.
For almost all of the Justices, a similar pattern is evident.
Whatever the particular Justice's reputation, significant counterexamples are available. Whether it is Justice Brennan, authoring
the environmentalist's nightmare of a dissent in San Diego Gas
Electric v. City of San Diego,4 3 which subsequently became the
Court's holding in First English Evangelical Church v. County of
45
Los Angeles,4 4 or Justice O'Connor, dissenting in First English,
and in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,4 6 in which she supported NRDC's more envi32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

480
483
505
456
464
480
438
511
438
448
478
450
482
See

U.S. 470 (1987).
U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 1003, 1061 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 305, 322 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 312, 344 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 572, 594 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, Burger, Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
U.S. 328, 340 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. 696 (1978).
U.S. 607 (1980).
U.S. 221 (1986).
U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
U.S. 304 (1987).
id. at 322 (O'Connor, J., joining in part, Stevens & Blackmun, JJ.,

dissenting).
46. 470 U.S. 116, 165 (1985).
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ronmentally protective reading of the Clean Water Act, while
47
Justice Brennan did not.
2. A more quantitative approach to the Justices' voting suggests, however, some discernible patterns and tendencies in the
votes of the Justices in environmental cases. These tendencies
may or may not be sufficiently strong to suggest a correlation between the votes and overarching labels such as "conservative" or
"liberal." But, in either event, they strongly suggest that, at least
for some justices, the environmental dimension of the case is relevant to how the Justice casts his or her vote in that case.
The objective of this analysis is to construct a scoring system
somewhat reminiscent of that employed by the League of Conservation Voters Test in scoring members of Congress on environmental matters.4 8 Here, however, it is applied to the Justices. A
Justice is awarded one point for each pro-environmental protection outcome for which the Justice voted. The final score, referred
to as an "EP score," is based on the percentage of pro-environmental votes the Justice cast, out of those cases in which that Justice
participated. For the purposes of calculating this score, the entire
database of 243 cases is not used. The scores are instead based on
a subset of approximately 100 cases, representing those cases that
are more susceptible to being assigned a pro-environmental position. 49 An EP score of 100 means that a Justice voted for the environmentally-protective outcome in all the cases in which she
participated. A score of zero means that the Justice voted for that
environmental outcome in none of the cases.
With regard to those Justices who were the most environmentally-protective, the scores are both easy and not surprising in
their results. 50 The highest score went to Justice Douglas, who
47. Justice Brennan joined Justice White's majority opinion, supplying the

needed fifth vote for EPA and against NRDC. See id. at 116.
48. See League of Conservation Voters, League of Conservation Voters National
Environmental Scorecard (visited May 28, 1999) <http://www.lcv.org/scorecards/
index.htm>.
.49. The cases upon which the EP Scores are based are those listed in italics in the
appendix.
50. The EP scores for the nineteen Justices who have served on the Court since
October Term 1969 are Chief Justice Burger (34.3), Justices Black (75), Blackmun
(50.3), Brennan (58.5), Breyer (66.6), Douglas (100), Ginsburg (63.6), Harlan (33.3),
Kennedy (25.9), Marshall (61.3), O'Connor (30.4), Powell (30), Chief Justice Rehnquist
(36.5), Scalia (13.8), Souter (57.1), Stevens (50.6), Stewart (42.6), Thomas (20), and
White (36.3). For a full description of the database upon which the EP analysis was
performed, see Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's "Environmental"AboutEnvironmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703 (2000).
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scored 100. Justice Douglas may well be the only environmental
Justice ever on the Court, at least in modern times. Notwithstanding his high profile, Justice Douglas was, as a practical matter, barely there for modern environmental law. He was off the
Court by 1975, and plagued by serious health problems during his
final time on the Court. As a result, he voted in only fifteen of the
100 cases surveyed for the EP Score.
The highest EP scores for those Justices serving on the Court
for substantial time are those of Justices Brennan (58.5), Marshall
(61.3) and Stevens (50.6).51 Each of their scores, however, is much
lower than Douglas' score. None of these other scores is sufficiently high to suggest that the environmental protection dimension of the various cases before the Court was a factor influencing
their respective votes.
The EP scoring analysis further identifies more Justices with
potentially revealing EP scores on the low end, suggesting some
possible skepticism, or perhaps even hostility, towards environmental protection concerns or the kind of legal regime such concerns promote. There are many EP scores below thirty-three, a
number below thirty, and two below twenty-five. As with the high
EP scores, there is a hands-down winner, though no score of zero
to equal Justice Douglas' score of 100. And, as with Justice Douglas, there are no surprises at the lowest of the low end.
The low score goes to Justice Scalia with a score just below
fourteen, which is strikingly low. It is a score so low that one can
fairly posit that Justice Scalia perceives environmental protection
concerns as promoting a set of legal rules antithetical to that
which he favors. Indeed, the kind of legal system promoted by environmental law seems to be of sufficient concern that it even
prompts Justice Scalia sometimes to abandon his views on core
matters involving constitutional and statutory interpretation. 52
51. Although the cases upon which the EP scores are based appear in the appendix, infra, the full related database, including the voting breakdown in each of those
cases, the case topic, the identity of the legal position in each case that received a
point, and the final EP scores of each of the Justices, is not separately published here
because of its substantial length. It instead appears in Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring
What's "Environmental"AboutEnvironmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 703 (2000).
52. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 (1992), embracing an interpretation of the Fifth Amendment based on "our constitutional culture," and his dissenting opinion in Public Utility District No. 1 v. Washington Department of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 724 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting), reaching for a construction of the Clean Water Act favored by
industry, are illustrative. See 511 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("While I agree

11
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What about Kennedy, the Court's current bellwether Justice
who has been in the majority in virtually every environmental
case before the Court since he joined the bench? His score is just
below twenty-six, which is the third lowest out of nineteen Justices over the past thirty years. Although Justice Kennedy's score
may well mask some significant potential for a future shift, 5 3 it
should be unsettling for environmentalists to learn that a score of
twenty-six represents the Court's current point of equilibrium.
3. Finally, viewed over time, the EP scores of the Justices indicate that the Court as a whole is steadily becoming less responsive to environmental protection. Indeed, the overall shift in the
fate of environmental protection before the Court during the past
three decades is telling. 5 4 In 1975, there were no Justices sitting
on the Court with scores below thirty. Today, there are three with
scores of thirty or below (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) and two
with scores of twenty or below (Scalia and Thomas). 5 5
II.

The Supreme Court's Apathy and Possible Antipathy
Towards Environmental Protection: Lessons for the
Current and Future Environmental Lawyer

The overall trends suggest a troubling result for those looking
to the Court to have an affirmative interest in promoting environmental protection. Environmental protection concerns implicated
fully with the thorough analysis in the Court's opinion, I add this comment for em-

phasis. For judges who find it unnecessary to go behind the statutory text to discern
the intent of Congress, this is (or should be) an easy case.").
53. Although Justice Kennedy's writing in the area remains sparse, he filed concurring opinions in three cases in which he expressed views that create at least the
theoretical possibility of his breaking away from Justice Scalia's approach. See Lucas
v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Eastern Enterprises v.Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2154 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Richard
Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENVT'L FORUM 8 (May/June 1999).
54. These comparisons are based on the Justices' EP scores for their entire careers and not their EP scores as of the precise date to which the text refers. A reference to the EP scores of the Justices in 1975, therefore, considers the career EP scores
of all the Justices who were serving on the Court in 1975, which will include their
votes before and after 1975. The 1975 date simply determines the identity of the
relevant Justices and does not confine the database with regard to precedent for purposes of calculating EP scores.
55. One must be careful, however, about too quickly equating the votes of individual Justices with Court rulings. The two do not necessarily correlate. For instance,
forty environmentally favorable votes could reflect five unanimous rulings or nine
five/four rulings. For that same reason, thirty environmentally favorable votes could
reflect six favorable Court rulings and, therefore, more than forty environmentally
favorable votes.
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by a case appear, at best, to play no favored role in shaping the
outcome. But nor does the outcome seem wholly neutral or indifferent to the presence of those concerns.
Over the past three decades, environmental protection concerns seem increasingly to be serving a disfavored role in influencing the Court's outcome. The preferred outcome is one that places
less, rather than more, weight on the need to promote environmental protection. The Court's decisions, and the attitudes of the
individual Justices, reflect increasing skepticism of the efficacy of
environmental protection goals and the various laws that seek
their promotion. This analysis leads to two significant conclusions
worth further analysis.
The first conclusion relates to the relative absence of any notion, for most of the Justices during the past three decades, that
environmental law is a distinct area of law, as opposed to just a
collection of legal issues incidentally arising in a factual setting
where environmental protection concerns are what is at stake.
The Court's opinions lack any distinct environmental voice. Missing is any emphasis on the nature or character of environmental
protection concerns and their import for judicial construction of
56
relevant legal rules. The Court's decisions in TVA v. Hill, City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,5 7 and Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,58 all represent
significant, albeit rare, victories for environmental concerns in the
Supreme Court. In none of those rulings, however, do those concerns play an explicit positive role, if any, in the Court's analysis.
Imagine, however, if Justice Douglas were on the Court and
writing any of the Court's opinions in those three cases. The
Court's rhetoric regarding environmental protection and its legal
relevance would be far different. Recall his genuine passion in
dissenting in Sierra Club v. Morton,5 9 in favor of expansive notions of legal standing on behalf of "inarticulate members of the
ecological group" (e.g. animals) where he argued in favor of legal
doctrine providing a voice in court "all of the forms of life ... the
pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear, the lemmings
as well as the trout in the streams." 60 Or consider Justice Black's
emotional dissent in San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas
56. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).

57. 511 U.S. 328 (1994).
58. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
59. 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

60. Id. at 752.
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Highway Commission,6 1 in which he decried cars "spew[ing] forth
air and noise pollution,"6 2 he warned of mothers "grow[ing] anxious.., lest their children be crushed beneath the massive wheels
of interstate trucks,"63 and he described environmental laws as
64
safeguarding "our Nation's well-being and our very survival."
Such emotion has meaning when it comes from the Supreme
Court.
For most of the Court, most of the time, environmental law
has become no more than a subspecies of administrative law, raising no special issues or concerns worthy of distinct treatment as a
substantive area of law. Environmental protection is merely an
incidental context for resolution of a legal question. Recall again
Justice White's decision to side with EPA in Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. NRDC,6 5 upholding the validity of variances for
technology-based standards otherwise applicable to discharges of
toxic effluent. He stressed in his note to Justice Marshall that resolution of the case did not make much of a difference to adminis66
trative law one way or the other.
What are the practical implications of the Court's approach to
environmental law for someone wanting to be an environmental
lawyer, or a lawyer concerned about environmental protection?
First, to be an outstanding environmental lawyer requires your
being an excellent lawyer. That means a law student zealously
pursuing a career in environmental law should not just concentrate on taking "environmental law" classes. Master the "wilderness" of administrative law. 67 Delve into the complexities of
federal courts and federal jurisdiction - likely the most important course many environmental public interest litigators take in
law school. Similarly, approach courses in corporations, tax, securities, and real estate law. More often than not, the fate of the
environmental interests will turn on the resolution of legal issues
rooted deeply in these other areas of law.
Likewise, as legal counsel, do not approach cases with environmental blinders on. Be ready to see and understand the case
or controversy in its broader legal context. And be ready to
61. 400 U.S. 968 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 969.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 971.
65. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
66. See supra note 15, and accompanying text.
67. See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an EnvironmentalLawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1970).
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master that broader legal context. Do not just read environmental
cases. An environmental lawyer is likely to find the most important, most relevant precedent elsewhere, precisely because it is
68
elsewhere.
Indeed, because of environmental protection's apparent disfavored status, the precedent most supportive of an environmentally-protective outcome frequently can be found in cases where
the favorable implications for environmental protection concerns
are not at all immediately obvious. The challenge of the environmental lawyer is to discover and exploit (and, when necessary, distinguish) that potentially relevant precedent. It may be in
nonenvironmental standing cases such as the Supreme Court's recent decision in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 69 which
supports broadened standing in environmental cases involving information reporting requirements; 70 or nonenvironmental regulatory takings cases such as Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfel, 71 in which
Justice Kennedy advances a more restricted approach to regulatory takings doctrine that could aid environmental regulators
faced with such constitutional challenges. 72
The second closely related lesson for the environmental lawyer is the importance of being strategic in framing and presenting
environmental cases in litigation. An environmental lawyer, especially one representing interests that support enhanced environmental protection measures, should not mistake her motivation
and interest in the case for what is likely to prompt a favorable
outcome in an administrative or judicial setting. The environmental lawyer must be open to the possibility that it may not be in her
client's strategic interest to emphasize the environmental protection dimensions of the case at all.
68. For example, the Supreme Court's ruling this past Term in Saenz v. Roe, 119

S. Ct. 1518 (1999), resurrecting the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege and Immunities Clause to strike down California's cap on welfare payments for new residents,
may well trigger a new wave of constitutional challenges brought by property owners
against environmental regulators based on that same Clause. See Carrie Johnson,
The Road to Saenz v. Roe, 22 THE LEGAL TimEs 1, May 24, 1999; Clint Bolick, Back
from the Grave - The Supreme Court Exhumes the 14th Amendment's 'Privilegesor
Immunities' Clause, 22 THE LEGAL TIMES 19, May 17, 1999.
69. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
70. See Cass Sunstein, Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 614-15, 621-24, 651-52, 663-67, 667-69 (1999).
71. 524 U.S. 498, 539-47 (1998).
72. See 524 U.S. 498, 539 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Richard Lazarus, Balance May Shift Against Scalia, ENV'L FORUM 8 (May/
June 1999).

15

16

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

An advocate needs, of course, to focus the decisionmaker on
her best legal or policy arguments. Those that the advocate cares
about, however, may not be those likely to motivate the decisionmaker towards the preferred outcome. Like any good lawyer,
the environmental lawyer needs to identify and address the decisionmaker's concerns, and not make the mistake of assuming that
she shares the advocate's own.
The current Court is, at the very least, not a Court comprised
of Justices looking at cases as "environmental law" cases. Other
crosscutting issues are more likely to influence their votes rather
than the environmental protection implications of one result over
another. What the Justices believe, for instance, should be the
relationship between courts and administrative agencies regarding matters of statutory construction, or, the relationship between
states and the federal government in their respective areas of lawmaking. The Justices strive for consistency on these crosscutting
issues that apply in a variety of contexts, of which environmental
law seems to be just one of many.
Different cases therefore require different strategies. For
Justice Scalia, it may well be to turn the case into a plain meaning
case, or a nonlegislative history case. 7 3 Indeed, for Scalia, there
may well be reason not to emphasize the positive environmental
protection implications of the side that you are promoting. For the
Chief Justice, it may well be to emphasize judicial integrity concerns, including the autonomy of trial courts, the costs of fragmented litigation, premature judicial decision making, and
possible burdens on the federal judiciary. 7 4 For Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor, it may well be the federalism implications of a particular outcome, stare decisis, concerns with judicial activism, and
the sheer inequities of a particular result.
73. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. EnvironmentalDefense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994);
Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund: Searchingfor PlainMeaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1, 15-19 (1995).
74. The Chief Justice's concerns with preserving state sovereignty in the Dormant Commerce Clause cases is one obvious example. See notes 23 to 32, supra, and
accompanying text. Similar concerns seem to temper Rehnquist's views on the regulatory takings issue. See Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and DiscountingHoldings in the Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099,
1111-14 (1996); Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Re: Agins v. City of Tiburon (May 29, 1980) (Official Papers of the Chambers of
Justice Thurgood Marshall) ("I am somewhat uneasy about the latitude which your
treatment of federal constitutional review of local zoning ordinances on pages 5 and 6
of your present draft appears to give federal courts."). Id.
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The more fundamental issue is whether, regardless of the
strategic advantages of thinking outside the "environmental" box
in environmental litigation, such a stripping of the "environment"
out of environmental law is a positive or appropriate development
for environmental law. My short answer is the law professor's
classic "yes and no." Some stripping is appropriate, but not to the
extent that has occurred in the Supreme Court.
Why is it partially appropriate? Simply because the Justices'
natural instinct about environmental law is partially correct: environmental law does not exist in a vacuum. Environmental law
issues do arise in contexts that implicate other, very important
crosscutting areas of law, such as administrative law, corporate
law, Tenth Amendment law, Fifth Amendment law, and criminal
law.
Nor is it happenstance that environmental law constantly
arises in these other contexts. So many different kinds of activities implicate environmental protection concerns that the legal requirements serving that end must necessarily be widely
applicable. Those legal requirements also necessarily create friction by restriking balances previously reached by other pre-existing legal rules governing that same activity. By promoting
rapid change in the law in response to increased public demands
for environmental protection, environmental law necessarily
places great pressure on lawmaking institutions and generates
conflicts between competing lawmaking fora, between sovereign
authorities (local, state, tribal and federal) and within their respective executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
The Justices' focus in the first instance on these crosscutting
issues is also quite proper. The Justices should strive for consistency in their resolution. There should not always be one answer
if environmental protection is at stake; and another answer if not.
Such singularly outcome-dependent judicial reasoning could seriously undermine the law's essential integrity and legitimacy.
But that is not to say that environmental protection concerns
are irrelevant when addressing those crosscutting issues. Such
concerns legitimately inform the judicial resolution of those issues
and sometimes justify striking a new and different balance. Environmental protection concerns need not always be a dispositive
factor to be legitimately so in some instances, and always to remain a relevant factor for separate consideration.
In the early 1970s, the Court appeared to understand the
broader implications of the nation's commitment to a legal regime
17
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for environmental protection. The Court seemed to recognize its
responsibility to account for the corresponding evolutionary pressures being triggered by that emerging legal regime on other intersecting areas of law and on lawmaking institutions. Since
then, the Court has too often mistakenly equated the judiciary's
involvement with such traditional, legitimate legal evolution with
the 1980s judicial bugaboo of "judicial activism."
The cost of this mistaken belief is substantial. The Court deprives itself of its ability to consider the sheer importance of environmental protection to the issues before the Court. Even more
fundamentally, the Court fails to consider how the special challenges that environmental protection presents may warrant
75
evolution in legal doctrine.
The Court's treatment of the issue of standing during the past
three decades is emblematic of its attitude towards environmental
law. The Court originally relaxed standing requirements in response to the special challenges presented by environmental
law. 76 The Court revised the standing doctrine in recognition of
the nature of the injuries at stake in environmental litigation being neither clearly economic nor physical.7 7 The Court likewise
took special account of the inevitable, uncertain and speculative
nature of such injuries, in particular, the more attenuated chain of
78
causation between action and injury.
In recent years the Court has handed down a series of standing rulings that fails to consider these challenges and, as a result,
makes it especially difficult for plaintiff citizens to maintain envi75. To be sure, one can perceive snippets of environmental law's influence in rare,
isolated opinions of the Justices. Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas was most apt to
see the relationship. For instance, in two cases in 1972, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water, 410 U.S. 719 (1972) and Associated Enterprises,Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement, 410 U.S. 743 (1972), the Court ruled that equal protection was
not violated by a state statute that excluded tenants and permitted only landowners
to vote for candidates for the water storage district and weighed their votes according
to the value of the land each owned. Justice Douglas perceived the cases differently
than the majority precisely because he understood the role that water played in the
lives and ecosystem of the affected tenants. See 410 U.S. at 749 ("It is also inconceivable that a body with the power to destroy a river by damming it and so deprive a
watershed of one of its most salient environmental assets does not have 'sufficient
impact' on the interests of people generally to invoke the principles of [this Court's
voting rights precedent]"). Id.
76. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631,
658-64 (1986).
77. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
78. See United States v. S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1973).
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ronmental lawsuits. The trend has been so plain that it even
prompted Justice Blackmun to question openly in dissent why the
Court systematically disfavored environmental plaintiffs in the
79
law of standing.
Another area is the law of regulatory takings. Here too, the
Court's early case law suggested an appreciation for how environmental protection and natural resource conservation concerns
might justify a rethinking of the nature of private property rights
in natural resources.8 0 But, the Court has since seemed more attracted to a view of property that is static, not dynamic, and therefore restricts the legislature's constitutional authority to promote
environmental protection. 8 '
Standing law and regulatory takings law are just two of the
more obvious examples. The Court's need to consider the lessons
supplied by environmental law in addressing crosscutting issues
extends to less obvious areas as well, such as corporate law. During the October 1997 Term, for instance, in United States v.
Bestfoods,8 2 the Court faced the question under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA),8 3 of the liability of a parent corporation for the actions
of a subsidiary. What was striking about the oral argument
before the Court was that the Justices were uniformly aware and
sympathetic to the important policy objectives underlying corporate law's limited liability rules, but were not similarly aware of
environmental law's competing concerns. Indeed, members of the
Court appeared shocked to learn from both government and industry counsel, the undisputed common ground regarding con84
gressional intent in CERCLA in terms of corporate liability.
79. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn expedition
through the law of environmental standing.") Id. After the presentation of this Garrison lecture and immediately before this article went to final press, the Supreme
Court took an anticipated, yet important, step toward reversing this trend in a ruling
noted later in this article. See infra, note 108.
80. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Penn Central
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1980).
81. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
82. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (1999).
84. Official Transcript of the Oral Argument before the United States Supreme
Court, United States v. Bestfoods, No. 97-454, pp. 16-17, 1998 U.S. Trans. Lexis 61
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Bringing the "Environment" Back to Environmental
Law: Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services

The important remaining question is whether existing trends
in the Court's approach to environmental law can be changed.
Past experience strongly suggests that the answer to that question may well depend on both the life experiences (professional
and personal) that the current and future Justices bring with
them to their work. It is no coincidence that the only Justice with
a significantly high EP Score (100) is Justice Douglas, whose
deeply-held views favoring environmental protection restrictions
find their roots in his life-long involvement with the natural environment as an avid hiker and outdoorsman.8 5 No current Justice
has comparable links to the natural environment in general or to
either resource conservation or environmental protection matters
86
more particularly.
Perhaps the short answer to the question of how best to restore the "environment" to environmental law in the Court might
be to find some way to provide individual Justices with personal
experiences that allow them to appreciate more fully the environmental stakes of the cases before the Court. But putting aside
such extra-judicial influences, the most viable basis for persuading the Justices of the need for placing greater weight on the environmental dimension of environmental law is going to be through
the facts of the individual cases brought to the Court's attention.
Each of those cases presents the Justices with a story about the
way in which laws affect the quality of life. The cumulative effect
of multiple stories can significantly affect the way the Justices decide what cases to hear and how then to decide the legal issues
presented.
To the detriment of environmental protection concerns, the
property rights movement has used this technique with enormous
success. By bringing to the Court's attention during the past several decades a series of cases, the factual allegations of which appear to support their claim of environmental regulatory
(March 24, 1998) (argument of Ms. Schiffer, counsel for the United States EPA); id. at
26-27 (argument of Mr. Geller, counsel for Bestfoods).
85. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN, 203-36 (Delta Pub. 1974).
86. The only current Justice with such possible strong personal ties to the natural
environment might be Justice David Souter, based on his reputation as a hiker. See
David Margolick, Bush's Court Choice: Ascetic at Home But Vigorous on Bench, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1990, at A1:3.
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overreaching, such as claims of economic wipe-outs,8 7 or wheelchair-bound, blind widows being denied the right to build a dream
home,8 8 these advocates have successfully fostered a general judicial skepticism about the reasonableness of environmental laws.
It is, of course, that same judicial skepticism that environmentalists and environmental regulators must now overcome.
Environmentalists and environmental regulators face a conundrum. As previously described, it is likely often not in their short
term strategic interests to emphasize the environmental dimension of a case because of the Court's current skepticism. But, unless environmentalists begin to tell their own story to the Justices,
they are unlikely to dispel that skepticism in the longer term. A
simultaneous accomplishment of those two often conflicting objectives will not be easy. It will require careful case management
and case selection to bring to the Justices' attention cases that
both instruct the Court on the important policies and values safeguarded by environmental protection laws and explain how such
safeguarding is entirely consistent with our nation's legal
traditions.
There is currently at least some reason for optimism that the
Court may be about to take an initial step in the right direction.
The Court has agreed to review this October 1999 Term a potentially very important environmental case, Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services.8 9 The Fourth Circuit's ruling
under review in Laidlaw90 was an absolutely disastrous decision
for environmentalists. But what made the lower court ruling so
significant was that it was not so much the product of a mere aberrational court of appeals decision than it was suggestive of the jurisprudential signals that the Supreme Court has been sending
out to the lower courts about the strict application of Article III
case or controversy requirements to environmental citizen suits.
For that same reason, however, the case provided the Court with
the opportunity both to embrace the important role Congress intended for citizen suits to serve in environmental law and to strike
a balance in constitutional Article III doctrine that is more accommodating to that congressional scheme.
87. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992).
88. Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997); see Richard
J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the United
States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 184-86 (1997).
89. 525 U.S. 1176 (1999).
90. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 149 F.3d 303 (4th
Cir. 1998).
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In Laidlaw, the plaintiff, Friends of the Earth, brought a
fairly routine citizen suit against an industrial facility owned by
Laidlaw Environmental Services based on hundreds of violations
of Laidlaw's Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, both by exceeding allowable mercury discharges and by violating monitoring and reporting requirements. 9 1 No Gwaltney9 2 threshold jurisdictional problem was
presented; no one disputed that the facility was in noncompliance
both at the time the sixty day-notice and the subsequent lawsuit
was filed. The trial took several years, however, and by the time
the trial was complete, the company was no longer in noncompliance. The district court, accordingly, declined any request for injunctive relief, but imposed more than $400,000 in civil penalties,
payable to the U.S. Treasury, and expressly indicated that an at93
torney's fee award would similarly be forthcoming.
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 94 The appellate court held that once the facility came into compliance, the
case became moot. 95 No Article III jurisdiction existed, the court
ruled, for either a civil penalties award or for an attorney's fee
award. 9 6 The court, accordingly, ordered dismissal of the action in
its entirety, an absolutely dramatic result. Consider the perverse
incentive the appellate court's reasoning provides a regulated facility. So long as the facility comes into compliance prior to final
judgment in a citizen suit enforcement action, a facility that has
long been in violation of the federal environmental law, both
before and after the filing of the complaint, cannot be subject to
either a civil penalty or an attorney's fee award. The incentive to
comply prior to suit is dramatically reduced. Also sharply reduced, if not wholly eliminated, is the longstanding incentive that
defendants in environmental citizen suits have historically had to
settle their cases. Such settlements have led to defendants' pay91. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 956 F. Supp. 588, 600-01, 610 (D. S.C.
1997).
92. In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49
(1987), the Court held that Clean Water Act citizen suits could not be maintained for
wholly past violations of that Act. See id. at 56-63. A plaintiff need, at a minimum,
set forth in the complaint good faith allegations of violations ongoing at the time that
the complaint is filed. See id. at 64-65.
93. See 956 F. Supp. at 610-11.
94. See 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).
95. See id. at 307.
96. See id. at 306-07. The court's attorney's fee decision was especially remarkable given that the court accompanied its ruling with a "but see" cite to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gwaltney. See id. at 307.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol17/iss1/1

22

1999]

LECTURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

ing hundreds of millions of dollars to support environmentally
97
beneficial projects.
From a purely historical perspective, the Court's granting certiorari in Friends of the Earth was, standing alone, of surprising
significance. The Court has heard almost 250 environmental
cases on the merits during the past thirty years, yet this was only
the second time that the Court granted a citizen suit petition in an
environmental case at the sole request of the citizen plaintiffs. To
be sure, the Justices have frequently done so at the behest of industry. 98 Likewise, they have often granted review at the request
of federal, state and local governments. 99 But it has been twentyseven years since the Court last granted review at the exclusive
request of environmental plaintiffs, and that was in Sierra Club v.
Morton'0 0 in 1972.
There is also good reason to believe that the Court granted
review in Friends of the Earth to rule in favor of the environmental plaintiffs. It takes four votes to grant review and it is unlikely
that the four votes this time came from Justices seeking to affirm
the Fourth Circuit's analysis. A Justice seeking to make it harder
for environmental plaintiffs to bring suits would not pick this case.
This is a case presenting a record in which the trial court found
97. See Comment, Jeff Ganguly, Environmental Remediation Through Supplemental Environmental Projects and Creative Negotiation: Renewed Community Involvement in FederalEnforcement, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 189 (1998); Comment,
Laurie Droughton, Supplemental EnvironmentalProjects:A Bargainfor the Environment, 12 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 789 (1995).
98. Two recent examples include The Steel Co. v. Citizens for A Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), but there are
many during the past three decades. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983);
Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (1987); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484
U.S. 49 (1988).
99. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287 (1981); Watt v. Energy Action Education Foundation, 454 U.S. 151
(1982); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S.
139 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S.
711 (1987); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989); Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
100. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). The closest exception is provided
by Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). But, in Hallstrom, the Court
granted certiorari (489 U.S. 1077 (1989)) only after asking the Solicitor General of the
United States about the advisability of granting review (see 488 U.S. 811 (1989)) and
then only after the United States filed a brief both advising the Court to hear the case
on the merits and to rule against the environmental petitioners (see Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, No. 88-42 (filed
February 17, 1989)), which the Court then did.
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hundreds of violations occurring over many years. 10 1 The violations, moreover, involve discharges of mercury; not substances
seemingly innocuous to a layperson or to a lay Justice. Mercury is
a highly toxic subsistence that persists, rather than degrades, in
the natural environment.1 0 2 The record further shows that the
district court imposed a hefty fine of several hundreds of
thousands of dollars, after finding that the company had enjoyed
an economic benefit of over one million dollars because of those
violations.103
A Justice seeking to erect mootness or other Article III barriers to citizen suit enforcement would look for a case with a very
different record. Far preferable would be a case involving more
seemingly innocuous pollutants,1 0 4 in order to both bolster possible suggestions of the frivolousness of the lawsuit and the lack of
necessity for citizen suit enforcement overall. Finally, no clear circuit conflict was presented by the petition for a writ of certiorari
because the Fourth Circuit relied upon a recent Supreme Court
ruling, The Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, not yet
considered in this identical context by other circuits.
Of course, four votes do not a majority make. The necessary
five-vote majority for the environmental plaintiffs in Friendsof the
Earth seems clearly in reach, however, in light of the Justices'
past voting record. In particular, at least two Justices, Kennedy
and O'Connor, seem quite open to the environmental plaintiffs
contention that the lower court misapplied mootness doctrine. Article III jurisdictional requirements is an area where both Justices
have written and/or joined separate opinions that reflect greater
awareness of the need for legal doctrine to evolve in response to
the special concerns raised by the demands of environmental protection. Justice O'Connor actually dissented in Lujan v. Defenders
101. See 956 F. Supp. at 600-01.
102. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ALAN
JAMES

P. LEAPE,

S.

MILLER,

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION -

CHISTOPHER

H.

SCHROEDER

LAW, SCIENCE, & POLICY

&

475 (1996).

103. See id. at 610-11, 613.
104. For example, some in the environmental community strongly urged the environmental plaintiffs in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997) not to seek Supreme Court review.
Although environmentalists were unanimously of the view that the Third Circuit's
ruling on standing in Magnesium Elektron was very harmful, legally erroneous, and
could form the basis of a strong petition for a writ of certiorari, there was far less
agreement on the essential strategic inquiry whether the case presented the facts
needed to make that legal argument in the strongest possible light. A substantial
proportion of the alleged violations of the Clean Water Act at issue involved discharges of salt and heat. See id. at 115.
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of Wildlife, and joined Blackmun's opinion, which denounced the
majority for its "slash and burn" of the law of environmental
standing.105 Kennedy, the current bellwether Justice for determining the majority ruling, 10 6 joined most of the majority opinion
in that same case, but he also wrote separately to stress, along
with Justice Souter, how environmental protection concerns
might justify Congress' allowance of less concrete injuries and
more attenuated chains of causation without offending Article III
10 7
of the Constitution.
Were both Justices Kennedy and O'Connor to fashion a majority with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg on the
issues before the Court in Friends of the Earth, the resulting opinion could begin to restore what makes environmental law "environmental." The Court could acknowledge that environmental
protection concerns warrant rethinking the way that Article III
standing and mootness requirements are understood and applied.
At the very least, the case represents an all-too-rare opportunity
for the Court to take a positive step in that direction.' 0 8
105. 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. See supra note 16 to 21 and accompanying text.
107. See 504 U.S. at 580 ("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed
before.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. Subsequent events reveal that such a positive step has now been taken. The
Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Friends of the Earth on March 1, 1999 (see
525 U.S. 1176 (1999)), which was a few days before the delivery of this Garrison lecture. The case was argued in October 1999, several months after the written manuscript for publication was complete. On January 12, 2000, just as this article was
going to final press, the Court announced its decision in the case. See Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw EnvironmentalServices, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000). As anticipated,
the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's mootness ruling. See 120 S.Ct. 693, 697
(1999). The Court, moreover, also rejected Laidlaw's effort to defend the court of appeals' judgment on the alternative ground that Friends of the Earth lacked Article III
standing. See id. The Court rejected Laidlaw's contention that a citizen suit plaintiff
must demonstrate actual injury to the natural environment. The Court ruled that
injury to the environment is not the relevant inquiry for standing, which should instead be whether the plaintiff has been injured. According to the Court, moreover,
Friends of the Earth had established such injury by establishing that their members'
reasonable concerns about the possible effects of the unlawful discharges had affected
adversely their willingness to use the waterway at issue. See id. at 698. The Court
further ruled that, because of their future deterrent effect, civil penalties could provide sufficient redress for citizen suit standing purposes even when the defendant was
currently in compliance and those penalties were payable exclusively to the federal
treasury. See id. The court's opinion departs significantly from some of the broader
implications in the Court's recent standing precedent, adverse to environmental citizen suit plaintiffs, discussed in this article's text. Justice Ginsburg authored the
Court's opinion, joined by six others, including Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
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Conclusion

Bringing the "environment" back to "environmental law" is, of
course, a long and not a short term undertaking. Even a ruling in
a single case such as Friendsof the Earth v. Laidlaw is only that:
a single ruling in a single case. It is a far cry from a reversal of the
trend disfavoring environmental protection that is apparent in the
Court's decisions during the past three decades.
Nor will the longer term restoration, now warranted, occur as
a result ultimately of the efforts of environmental lawyers of my
generation, or the efforts of David Sive, Joe Sax, Bill Rodgers, or
Ollie Houck. It will depend largely on the future efforts of today's
law students, such as those here at Pace and at other law schools,
who are about to embark on a career in environmental law.
Environmental lawyers of my generation found inspiration in
the work of those who came before us, including Lloyd Garrison.
All I can hope for is that today's law students include some who
will find the necessary inspiration in the work of those within my
own generation of environmental lawyers and scholars; that they
will be thoughtful, strategic advocates for environmental law's important goals, and that they will work towards environmental
law's restoration in our nation's highest court.

opinion, which Justice Thomas joined. The favorable outcome in the Supreme Court
would seem to confirm the wisdom of the environmentalist strategy of not seeking
review in earlier cases presenting far less favorable facts. See note 105, supra.
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Appendix
Environmental Cases Decided By The United States
Supreme Court
October Term 1969-October Term 1998
Cite
397 U.S.
397 U.S.
400 U.S.
401 U.S.
401 U.S.
401 U.S.

88
620
48
402
493
520

401 U.S. 527
402 U.S. 159
402 U.S. 558
403
405
406
406
406
409
409

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

9
727
91
109
117
80
470

410
410
410
410

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

73
641
719
743

411 U.S. 325
411 U.S. 624
411 U.S. 655
412
412
412
412

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

481
541
580
669

414 U.S. 44
414
415
416
416

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

313
289
1
861

Year
Name*
Decided
Arkansas v. Tennessee
1970
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma
1970
Hickel v. Oil Shale
1970
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
1971
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp
1971
United States v. District Court in and for the
1971
County of Eagle
United States v. District Court in and for Water
1971
Division No. 5
United States v. Southern Ute Tribe of Band of
1971
Indians
United States v. InternationalMinerals & Chemical
1971
Corp.
Utah v. United States
1971
Sierra Club v. Morton
1972
Illinois v. Milwaukee
1972
Washington v. General Motors Corp.
1972
Nebraska v. Iowa
1972
United States v. Jim
1972
Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United
1973
States
EPA v. Mink
1973
Ohio v. Kentucky
1973
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water
1973
Associated Enterprises Inc. v. Toltec Watershed
1973
Improvement
Askew v. American Waterway Operators
1973
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc
1973
United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
1973
Corp.
Mattz v. Arnett
1973
Fri v. Sierra Club
1973
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.
1973
United States v. SCRAP Aberdeen and Rockfish
1973
Railroad Co. v. SCRAP
Department of Game of the State of Washington v.
1973
The Puyallup Tribe
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona
1973
Mississippi v. Arkansas
1974
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas
1974
Air Pollution Variance Board of Colorado v.
1974
Western Alfalfa Corp
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Cite
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420 U.S.
420
420
420
421
421

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

422 U.S.
422 U.S.
422 U.S.
424
425
426
426
426
426

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

426
426
426
426

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

427
427
429
430
431
431
434
435
435
436
436
437
437
438
438
438
438
440

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

246
390
363
112
99
265
275
151
519
371
604
153
617
59
104
645
696
391

440 U.S. 668
441 U.S. 322

Name*
Train v. City of New York
Train v. Campaign Clean Water
Antoine v. Washington
Utah v. United States
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power
Comm'n Arizona PSC v. Chemehuevi Tribe of
Indians FPC v. Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians
United States v. Maine
United States v. Louisiana
United States v. Florida
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Wilderness
Society
United States v. Louisiana
United States v. Alaska
Aberdeen and Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP; United
States v. SCRAP
Alamo Land & Cattle Co v. State of Arizona
Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast
Train v. Colorado Public Interest Group
Cappaert v. United States
Hancock v. Train
EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Board
New Hampshire v. Maine
Texas v. Louisiana
Kleppe v. New Mexico
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers
Association
Union Electric Co. v. EPA
Kleppe v. Sierra Club
Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis
E I DuPont de Nemours v. Train
EPA v. Brown
Douglas v. Seacoast Prod
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana
Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod
TVA v. Hill
Philadelphiav. New Jersey
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Grp
Penn Central Transp v. City of New York
California v. United States
United States v. New Mexico
Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency
Leo Sheep Co. v. United States
Hughes v. Oklahoma
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442 U.S. 347
442 U.S. 653
443 U.S. 658
444
444
444
444

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

51
164
206
223
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445
445
445
445
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446
446
446
447
447
447
447
448
448
448
449
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450
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

335
193
198
253
535
715
253
500
578
657
1
125
255
352
242
371
607
64
456
544
621
259
287
264

452 U.S. 314
453 U.S. 1
453 U.S. 490
453 U.S. 609
454 U.S. 139
454
454
456
457
457

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

151
516
305
55
273

458 U.S. 941
459 U.S. 176

Name*
Andrus v. Sierra Club
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe
Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel
Andrus v. Allard
KaiserAetna v. United States
Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp
Stryker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen;
City of New York v. Karlen; Secretary of HUD v.
Karlen
Ohio v. Kentucky
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation
United States v. Clarke
United States v. Mitchell
Andrus v. Idaho
United States v. Louisiana
Andrus v. Utah
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc.
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.
United States v. California
California v. Nevada
Agins v. City of Tiburon
Bryant v. Yellen
United States v. Ward
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians
Industrial Union v. American Petroleum
EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn
State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
State of Montana v. United States
San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego
Watt v. Alaska
California v. Sierra Club
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Act
Hodel v. Indiana
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Assn
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
Commonwealth Edison v. State of Montana
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii Peace
Education Project
Watt v. Energy Action Educational Foundation
Texaco v. Short
Weinberger v. Romero Barcelo
Zobel v. Williams
California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. United
States
Sporhase v. Nebraska
Colorado v. New Mexico
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1980
1980
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1980
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460 U.S. 300
460 U.S. 605
460 U.S. 766
461 U.S. 190
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462
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466
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

1
229
310
837
986
274
504
93
116
84
759
172

473
473
474
474

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

568
753
121
494

475 U.S. 1
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476
477
477
477
478

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

89
355
227
498
834
131
207
340
221

Name*
North Dakota v. United States
Arizona v. California
Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy
Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Comm'n
Block v. North Dakota
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc
Baltimore Gas & Electric v. NRDC
Texas v. New Mexico
Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon
Nevada v. United States
United States v. Mitchell
Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Indians
Silkwood v. Kerr Mc-Gee Corp.
Secretary of the Interior v. California
Louisiana v. Mississippi
Summa Corp v. California
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of
Mission Indians
Kirby Forest Industries v. United States
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
Colorado v. New Mexico
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Ohio v. Kovacs
United States v. Maine
United States v. Louisiana
Chemical Manufacturer'sAss'n v. NRDC
United States v. Locke
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians
Williamson County Regional Planning v. Hamilton
Bank
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co
Oregon Dept of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Tribe
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l
Protection
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commn of Calif
United States v. Maine
Exxon Corp. v. Hunt
Dow Chemical v. United States
South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe
United States v. Mottaz
Maine v. Taylor
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc.
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U.S.
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
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481
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531
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U.S.
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490
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871
380
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437
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569
607
334
353

504 U.S. 555
505 U.S. 88

Name*
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council
for Clean Air
United States v. James
InternationalPaper Co. v. Ouellette
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell
California Coastal Comm'n v. GraniteRock Co.
United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma
Tull v. United States
Hodel v. Irving
Texas v. New Mexico
Utah Division of State Lands v. United States
FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council
for Clean Air
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri
United States v. Louisiana
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n
Cotton Petroleum Corp v. New Mexico
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
New Orleans Public Service Inc. v. City of New
Orleans
Philip Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of Yakima Indiana Nation
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County
California v. FERC
General Motors Corp v. United States
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
Illinois v. Kentucky
Oklahoma v. New Mexico
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier
Wyoming v. Oklahoma
Arkansas v. Oklahoma
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society
Yee v. City of Escondido
United States v. Alaska
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of
NaturalResources
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n
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505 U.S.
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506 U.S.
507 U.S.
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584
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U.S.
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U.S.
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43
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1
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1
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U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

83
726
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38
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Name*
New York v. United States
City of Burlington v. Dague
Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council
Mississippi v. Louisiana
Nebraska v. Wyoming
South Dakota v. Bourland
Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl
Quality of the State of Oregon
Chicago v. EnvironmentalDefense Fund
C&A Carbone Inc v. Town of Clarkstown
PUD, No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept
of Ecology
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States
City of Ladue v. Gilleo
Dolan v. City of Tigard
Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co; City of
Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.
Kansas v. Colorado
Nebraska v. Wyoming
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Colorado
Louisiana v. Mississippi
United States v. Maine
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.
Babbitt v. Youpee
Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Association
Bennett v. Spear
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
United States v. Alaska
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho
City of Boerne v. Flores
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment
Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club
New Jersey v. New York
United States v. Beggerly
United States v. Bestfoods
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute
Indian Tribe
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